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PRESERVING THE SANCTITY OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: THE COMPENSABILITY OF TRAVEL 
TIME FOLLOWING FLSA SECTION 203(o) DONNING 
AND DOFFING ACTIVITY 
Nicholas Hart+ 
Here was a population, low-class and mostly foreign, hanging always 
on the verge of starvation, and dependent for its opportunities of life 
upon the whim of men every bit as brutal and unscrupulous as the old-
time slave-drivers; under such circumstances immorality is exactly as 
inevitable, and as prevalent, as it was under the system of chattel 
slavery.1 
 
The exploitation of early factory workers, so vividly depicted in Upton 
Sinclair’s The Jungle,2 has been largely eradicated through the growth of the 
regulatory state.  For a select group of workers, however, inequities still remain 
between the hours they work and the wages they receive.  These workers are 
required to report to work before their shift begins to change into uniforms or 
protective clothing that usually includes flame retardant or sanitary clothing,3 
steel-toed boots, 4  hard hats, 5  gloves, safety goggles, and earplugs. 6   The 
employee then makes the trip to the factory floor, which may be a short walk 
from the changing room or a bus trip across an industrial complex taking several 
                                                        
 + J.D., January 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.M., 2009, 
University of Cincinnati.  The author is grateful to Professor Benjamin Mintz for his valuable 
comments and insight, and to Jake McDermott for his guidance when writing this Comment.  He 
would also like to thank his father, whose countless hours spent discussing the realities of collective 
bargaining were invaluable in formulating the author’s ideas.  Thanks are also due to Professor 
Roger C. Hartley and the attorneys at Murphy Anderson PLLC for their comments and guidance 
throughout the author’s writing process.  Finally, the author gives his utmost gratitude to the staff 
and editors of The Catholic University Law Review whose hard work was instrumental in the 
publication of this Comment. 
 1. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 109 (1906). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 592  (7th Cir. 2012) (considering 
whether employee compensation is necessary for the time spent putting on flame retardant 
clothing), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014); Arnold v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (examining compensation for the time spent putting on sanitary uniforms). 
 4. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(requiring workers to change into clean and sanitized steel-toe boots at the work facility). 
 5. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 592 (listing hard hats as part of the workers’ changing regimen); 
Schreiber Foods, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 674 (noting that Schreiber Foods workers wear hard hats while 
working on the production line). 
 6. Schreiber Foods, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (explaining that employees put on safety goggles, 
gloves, and a hairnet before leaving the changing area and entering their work stations). 
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minutes.7  Once each employee arrives at his or her workstation, the employee 
clocks in and the compensated workday begins.8 
Unions, through negotiations with employers, may waive compensation for 
the time spent donning and doffing via the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
Section 203(o) exclusion. 9   Added to the FLSA in 1949, 10  this provision 
authorizes the time spent changing into work clothes11 by union employees to 
be uncompensated.12  Should, however, the provision extend to mean that the 
worker is also not entitled to compensation for post-donning and pre-doffing 
time spent traveling from the changing room to the factory floor? 
The Portal-to-Portal Act,13 which regulates the compensability of travel time 
in the workplace, created two exemptions to the FLSA employee compensation 
requirements.14  The first exemption excludes all time spent traveling to and 
from the workplace from compensation.15  The second exemption covers time 
spent performing tasks that are “preliminary or postliminary” to the employee’s 
                                                        
 7. For example, U.S. Steel asserted in the District Court that it could take as many as eight 
minutes for a worker to travel from the changing room to their work station.  See Sandifer v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., No. 2:07-CV-443 RM, 2009 WL 3430222 at *17 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2009).  This 
means that in U.S. Steel Corp.’s Gary, Indiana complex, some workers have been losing more  
sixty-nine hours worth of wages for their travel time for every year they work.  See id. at *1,  
*16–18. 
 8. The industry refers to this as “line time,” which is a form of wage calculation that 
measures the workday from the beginning to the end of production on the work line.  See Sepulveda, 
591 F.3d at 212. 
 9. Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides: 
In determining for the purposes of . . . this title the hours for which an employee is employed, there 
shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each 
workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express 
terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to 
the particular employee. 
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). 
 10. See Act of Oct. 26, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 63 Stat. 910 (codified at  
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006)). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).  The exclusion also covers washing time.  Id.  However, for simplicity, 
this Comment will focus solely on donning and doffing, otherwise called changing time, and not 
time spent washing at the beginning or end of a workday. 
 12. The exclusion may be applied as a result of either the custom or practice of the bargaining 
unit or the express language of a collective bargaining agreement.  29 U.S.C. § 203(o).  The term 
custom and practice is not meant to implicate “industry” standards.  See  
29 C.F.R. § 790.10(d) (2013).  Instead, “‘custom’ and ‘practice,’. . . may be said to be descriptive 
generally of those situations where an employer, without being compelled to do so by an express 
provision of a contract, has paid employees for certain activities performed.”  29 C.F.R.  
§ 790.10(c). 
 13. The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, et seq. (2006) 
 14. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires compensation for all productive work that 
is performed by an employee on behalf of the employer.  29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (2006); see also 
infra Part I (discussing the FLSA’s compensation rules). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (2006). 
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job.16  As a result, compensation is required for all hours an employee works, 
including time spent traveling between principal activities.17 
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the required donning and doffing of 
work clothes may be a principal activity that triggers compensation for a 
continuous workday.18  This ruling, however, left open the question of whether 
the required donning and doffing of work clothes may still be considered a 
principal activity triggering compensation for a continuous workday if the union 
and employer exclude compensation under FLSA Section 203(o).19 
Congress added Section 203(o) to the FLSA to preserve the “sanctity of 
collective-bargaining agreements” after the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act.20  
Congress feared that because courts required compensation for all “principal” 
activities, the Portal-to-Portal Act would undermine the highly unionized 
industries that define the workday in collective bargaining agreements, resulting 
instead in the very windfalls that the Portal-to-Portal Act was passed to 
prevent. 21   Historically, Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence has sought to 
determine whether the activity is principal in nature and thus compensable.22  
                                                        
 16. This exemption only applies if the preliminary or postliminary activities take place before 
the performance of the first and after the performance of the final principal activity of the 
employee’s workday.  29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).  The Code of Federal Regulations defines a 
preliminary activity is any “activity engaged in by an employee before the commencement of his 
‘principal’ activity or activities.”  29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b) (2013).  A postliminary activity is defined 
as one “engaged in by an employee after the completion of his ‘principal’ activity or activities.”  
Id.  Although there is no definitive list of these exempted activities, the regulations specifically 
mention “[w]alking, riding, or traveling to or from the actual place of performance of the principal 
activity or activities which (the) employee is employed to perform.”  Id.  However, travel time that 
is performed during the course of the employee’s principal job duties is not the type of activity 
exempted by the Portal-to-Portal Act.  Id. at § 790.7(d). 
 17. This is known as the continuous workday rule.  See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a).  The regulation 
establishing this rule states, in part: 
Under the provisions of section 4, one of the conditions that must be present before 
“preliminary” or “postliminary” activities are excluded from hours worked is that they 
“occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which the employee 
commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases” the 
principal activity or activities which he is employed to perform. 
Id.; see also infra Part I.B (discussing the continuous workday rule in greater depth). 
 18. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 29–30 (2005). 
 19. Most recently, the Supreme Court refused to hear the question of whether travel time 
following and preceding excluded changing and washing activities is compensable.  See Sandifer 
v. U.S. Steel Petition for Certiorari, Granted in Part, Denied in Part, 133 S. Ct. 1240, 2013 WL 
598470 (2013).  Instead, the court only decided the issue of the definition of clothes under Section 
203(o).  Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014) (finding that, for the purposes of the statute, 
“clothes” will be given its ordinary meaning of articles of clothing that cover the body). 
 20. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter); see also infra 
Part II. 
 21. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a)(4). 
 22. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252–53 (1956) (establishing that the donning 
and doffing of work clothes may be a principal activity when that activity is “integral and 
indispensible” to the employee’s job); Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260, 261–63 (1956) 
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Courts, however, have not examined whether compensation is a prerequisite for 
principal activity status.23   As a result of these competing principles, there is an 
emerging split in authority when determining whether the required donning and 
doffing of work clothes is a principal activity if it is not compensated because of 
a valid Section 203(o) exclusion.24 
Part I of this Comment explores the prior law and sets forth the current 
framework for determining the compensability of work.  It then examines the 
emerging authoritative split in interpreting the principal nature of work 
performed under a Section 203(o) exclusion.  Part II demonstrates that this 
authoritative split is damaging to the effective implementation of the Section 
203(o) exclusion and calls for a resolution to this split.  Part III seeks to resolve 
the current inconsistencies of Section 203(o) jurisprudence by creating a new 
standard asserting that under the Section 203(o) exclusion, donning and doffing 
is a per se principal activity that triggers compensation for the continuous 
workday.  Because Section 203(o) is at its core a collective bargaining provision, 
the final part of this Comment analyzes the proposed standard in the context of 
the current collective bargaining regime. 
I.  WHEN IS WORK WORK? 
Before determining whether an activity is principal for the purposes of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, the activity must first qualify as “work.”25  Therefore, a 
brief overview of the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act, the continuous workday 
rule, and Section 203(o) is required. 
                                                        
(finding that the sharpening of knives by meat cutters is “an integral part of and indispensible to” 
the employee’s job and thus compensable under the FLSA). 
 23. The test for determining principal activity status is whether the activity is “integral and 
indispensible” to the employee’s principal job duties, not whether the activity is compensated. See 
Steiner, 350 U.S. at 252–53 (1956) (affirming the Court of Appeals’s determination that activities 
that are “an integral and indispensible part of the principal activities” may not be exempted by the 
Portal-to-Portal Act). 
 24. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that 
since the Section 203(o) donning and doffing activity was uncompensated, it could not be a 
principal activity triggering compensation for the travel time as part of the continuous workday), 
aff’d on other grounds 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619–20 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that Section 203(o) activity was integral and indispensible and thus a principal 
activity triggering compensation for the travel time under a continuous workday). 
 25. The FLSA defines “employ” as “includ[ing] to suffer or permit to work.”   
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006).  This definition has been interpreted to mean any work that is performed 
primarily for the benefit of the employer.  See, e.g., Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 
148, 152 (1947) (holding that the trainees of a railroad were not employed by the railroad while in 
still in school because “[the Act’s] definitions of ‘employ’ and of  
‘employee’ . . . cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his own 
interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and instruction” because the definitions 
accomplish the purpose of the Act, which was, “as to wages . . . to insure that every person whose 
employment contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his services for less than 
the prescribed minimum wage”). 
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A.  The Fair Labor Standards Act: To Suffer or Permit to Work 
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 as a response to substandard wages and 
as a means to ensure that all employees receive “[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s 
work.”26  The statute provides: 
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in 
the production of goods for commerce, wages [equal to or greater than 
the minimum wage].27 
To “employ” a worker means “to suffer or permit to work,” but the statutory 
definition leaves significant room for judicial interpretation.28  “Work” has been 
defined in multiple ways.  The most common definition is “physical or mental 
exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.”29  In 
1944, the Supreme Court expanded this broad definition to include 
nonexertional acts, asserting that an employee may be hired to wait for 
productive work to arise, or even be hired to do nothing at all.30  The Court later 
affirmed this expansive reading of “work,” holding that the FLSA’s 
requirements “are to be ‘narrowly construed against . . . employers’ and are to 
be withheld except as to persons ‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms 
and spirit.’”31 
B.  The Portal-to-Portal Act: Exempting Preliminary and Postliminary 
Activities from Work Time 
In a series of a cases in the 1940s, the Supreme Court added to the definition 
of “work” by holding that time spent walking from a factory’s entryway to the 
                                                        
 26. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quoting 81 CONG. 
REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt)), superseded by statute,  
Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (2006). 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2006 & 2012).  The current federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour 
is a floor; states may enact minimum wages greater than the federal mandate.   
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).  The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division catalogs current State 
minimum wage rates.  See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, DEPT. OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR 
DIV. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#.UJrwSKmg1UQ.  In addition 
to minimum wage regulations, the FLSA also requires overtime wages, equal to 150 percent of the 
employee’s hourly wage, for all work beyond eight hours in a day or forty hours in a work-week.  
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(2006). 
 28. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
 29. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944), 
superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (2006). 
 30. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). 
 31. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 
U.S. 388, 392 (1960)). 
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employee’s workstation is compensable under the FLSA.32   This expansion 
triggered a legislative response that came to be known as the Portal-to-Portal 
Act.33  The Portal-to-Portal Act exempts certain activities from compensable 
time.  These exemptions include travel to and from, but not within, the 
workplace and activities that occur at the workplace but happen before or after 
an employee is engaged in their principal work activities.34 
Although both of the statutory exceptions use the phrase “principal activity,” 
neither the statute nor the Department of Labor’s regulations clearly define what 
constitutes a principal activity.35  The Supreme Court , however, has thoroughly 
examined the definition of “preliminary and postliminary” activities.36 
In Steiner v. Mitchell, the first Supreme Court case examining the  
Portal-to-Portal Act, the majority held that “preliminary and postliminary” 
activities are those activities that are “an integral and indispensable part of the 
principal activities.”37 
In confusing circularity, this “integral and indispensable” holding establishes 
an exception to the Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions: if the performance of an 
otherwise preliminary or postliminary activity is “an integral and indispensable 
part” of a worker’s principal activity, the worker must be paid for it under the 
FLSA, even if the Portal-to-Portal Act would otherwise exempt the activity from 
compensation.38  This universally accepted reading of the Portal-to-Portal Act is 
critically important because Department of Labor regulations state that donning 
                                                        
 32. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946) (holding that when 
an employee is required to be physically present at the employer’s workplace, “on duty or at a 
prescribed workplace,” the time spent on the premises shall be compensated), superseded by 
statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 
United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161, 163 (1945) (holding that workers must be 
compensated for the time spent traveling between a bituminous mine’s portal and the working face), 
superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.; Tenn. Coal, Iron  
& R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 603 (holding that workers must be compensated for the time spent traveling 
between an iron ore mine’s portal and the employee’s work site). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.  This Act was a congressional effort to limit judiciary overreach.  
Congress found that courts had been interpreting the FLSA “in disregard of long-established 
customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees,” which imposed on 
employers the potential for immensely burdensome liabilities and financial uncertainty so as to 
freeze development and growth in the industry, create economic imbalances between industries, 
and difficulty engaging in voluntary collective bargaining.  29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006). 
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2006 & 2012). 
 35. The statute is silent on the definition of principal activities.  See 29 U.S.C. § 262 (defining 
employee, employer, wage, Walsh-Healey Act, Davis-Bacon Act, and state, but not principal 
activity).  The Department of Labor, however, through its rulemaking authority, defines “principal 
activities” as those “which the employee is ‘employed to perform.’”  29 C.F.R.  
§ 790.8(a) (2013).  This term includes “all activities which are an integral part of a principal 
activity.”  29 C.F.R. § 790.8(b) (2013). 
 36. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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and doffing protective gear may be “integral and indispensable” in certain 
situations.39 
1.  The “Continuous Workday” Rule: Compensation is Required for All 
Time Spent Between Principal Activities 
Compensation for a workday is based on a principle known as the continuous 
workday rule.40  A “workday” is “the period between the commencement and 
completion on the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or 
activities.”41 Through this definition of “workday,” the Department of Labor has 
created an additional exception to the Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions.42 
This exception requires employers to compensate employees for activities 
occurring between the performance of the employee’s first and final “principal 
activity” of the day, even when the Portal-to-Portal Act would expressly provide 
otherwise.43  However, the Supreme Court has expansively interpreted the scope 
of “principal activities” to include “any activity that is ‘integral and 
indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity.’”44  Thus, even activities not typically 
considered “principal activities” can begin the workday if they are “integral and 
indispensable” to a principal activity.45  Therefore, employers must compensate 
workers for all working time accrued subsequent to the initial activity until the 
employee completes his final principal activity of the workday, even if parts of 
those hours would not be compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act 
exemptions.46 
                                                        
 39. Specifically, the regulation states: 
If an employee in a chemical plant, for example, cannot perform his principal activities 
without putting on certain clothes, changing clothes on the employer’s premises at the 
beginning and end of the workday would be an integral part of the employee’s principal 
activity.  On the other hand, if changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee 
and not directly related to his principal activities, it would be considered as a 
‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity rather than a principal part of the activity. 
29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c). 
 40. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6; see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 42 (2005) (holding activities 
performed between the first and last principal activities of the workday are compensable as part of 
the “continuous workday”). 
 41. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b). 
 42. Id. at § 790.6(a).  The regulation states: 
[T]o the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after the employee 
commences to perform the principal activity on a particular workday and before he ceases 
the performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of 
[Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act] have no application. 
Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005). 
 45. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 790.6. 
 46. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6. 
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The courts have consistently held that the donning and doffing of work clothes 
may be a integral and indispensable part of a worker’s principal workday.47  The 
inquiry, however, is fact-dependent.48  Most recently, in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez the 
Supreme Court, “conclude[d] that the locker rooms where . . . donning and 
doffing took place are the relevant ‘place of performance’ of the principal 
activity,” thus triggering compensation for a continuous workday.49 
C.  The Section 203(o) Exclusion for Donning and Doffing by Union 
Employees 
With this reasoning in mind, Congress amended the FLSA in 1947 to allow 
unions and employers to exempt the time spent donning or doffing work clothes 
from compensable time. 50   When considering the exclusion, Congress 
determined that deference to the terms of a “bona fide collective-bargaining 
agreement” is more in the FLSA’s spirit of protecting the interests of covered 
workers than strict, categorical adherence to a poorly-crafted, imprecise 
mandate.51 
These exclusions, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), are valid as long as two 
conditions are met. 52   First, the donning and doffing must be considered 
“changing clothes.”53   Second, compensation for this time must be waived 
                                                        
 47. See, e.g., Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37 (holding that the donning and doffing of work clothes 
may be a principal activity for the purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act); Steiner, 350 U.S. 247, 256 
(1956) (concludig that donning and doffing is a principal activity if it is integral and indispensible 
to the employee’s job). 
 48. See, e.g., Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-98-5005-RHW, 2001 WL 34897841 at *11–14 
(E.D. Wash. Sep. 14, 2001) (considering the type of clothing and protective equipment, the amount 
of time it took the employees to don and doff the clothing and protective equipment, and the 
employer’s reasons for requiring employees to wear the clothing and protective equipment as 
factors in examining the principal nature of the donning and doffing activity), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 
(2005). 
 49. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 34 (holding that the donning and doffing of work clothes is a principal 
activity which in turn requires compensation for the time walking between the changing station and 
work station). 
 50. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 49-393, 63 Stat. 910 (codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006)). 
 51. See 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter) (explaining that 
section 203(o) was enacted to avoid the situation where the Department of Labor deems illegitimate 
a previously agreed up collective bargaining agreement that specified that no compensation would 
be paid for donning or doffing of work clothes, thereby forcing employers to retrospectively 
determine the back pay owed to employees for these activities). 
 52. Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 53. Id.  There has long been a controversy over the definition of work clothes.  See, e.g., 
Kimberly D. Krone, And You Don’t Get Paid for That: Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act Does Not Apply to Donning and Doffing of Safety Gear, 9 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 35, 67–72 
(2012) (arguing that the donning and doffing of safety gear is a principal activity and that the 
exclusion should only be applied to changing in and out of “regular work clothing”); James Watts, 
Comment, Dressing for Work Is Work: Compensating Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards 
2014] Compensating for Travel Time 505 
through express contractual language or by the custom or practice 54  of the 
employer and bargaining unit.55 
As the Supreme Court has stated, the exclusion’s “clear implication is that 
clothes changing and washing, which are otherwise a part of the principal 
activity [for the purposes of Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions], may be expressly 
excluded from coverage by agreement.”56  Thus, even if donning and doffing is 
“integral and indispensible” and, as a result, compensable under the Portal-to-
Portal Act, an employer and union may still “opt out” by excluding the time from 
compensation under their collective-bargaining agreement or through custom or 
practice.57  The inquiry remains as to whether, after an employer and a union 
apply the exclusion, the donning and doffing, which would otherwise be 
principal in nature, may retain that status and trigger compensation under a 
continuous workday. 
D.  The Emerging Authoritative Split Regarding the Principal Nature of 
Changing Time Under Section 203(o) exclusions 
Federal courts and the Department of Labor have split, both internally and 
with each other, when deciding the nature of travel time following activity 
excluded under Section 203(o).  This split has resulted in two predominant tests 
for determining the compensability of travel time following excluded donning 
and doffing.  The first standard, adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Franklin v. 
Kellogg Co., employs a traditional FLSA analysis to determine whether the 
excluded activity preceding or following the travel time is principal in nature 
and thus triggers compensation for that travel time.58  In contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit applies a conflicting standard that all activities excluded under Section 
                                                        
Act for Donning and Doffing Protective Gear, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 297, 298 (2010) 
(highlighting the current authoritative split between the Tenth, Third, Ninth, and Second Circuits 
over what types of clothing may be excluded under Section 203(o)).  This conflict, however, has 
since been resolved in Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, where the court defined work clothes under Section 
203(o) as “items that are both designed and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as 
articles of dress.”  134 S.Ct. 870, 876 (2014). 
This comment, however, focuses only on the travel time following those instances in which the 
donning and doffing is an activity that is properly excluded under Section 203(o). 
 55. Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 214. For further discussion of when compensation is waived by 
custom or practice, see Turner v. City of Phila., 262 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
custom or practice is a restatement of “the well-established principle of labor law that a particular 
custom or practice can become an implied term of a labor agreement through a prolonged period 
of acquiescence”). 
 56. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 257, 255 (1956). 
 57. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 131 (1994) (describing Section 203(o) as an “opt 
out” provision). 
 58. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2010); see also DEPT. OF LABOR, 
WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, at 1 (June 16, 2010), available 
at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.pdf (finding that 
travel time following excluding donning and doffing activity may be a compensable integral and 
indispensible activity of the principal workday). 
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203(o) are not principal in nature, and therefore prohibits compensation for the 
travel time.59  This split has resulted in a growing analytical conflict where on 
the one hand, courts embark on a fact-intensive examination of the excluded 
activity while on the other hand, courts disregard that excluded activity. 
1.  The Kellogg Test: Individual Analysis of the Excluded Activity 
In Franklin v. Kellogg Co., workers at Kellogg’s Tennessee plant brought suit 
seeking back pay for time spent donning and doffing mandatory protective 
clothing and the time spent traveling between the work line and the changing 
rooms at the beginning of their shifts, for their work breaks, and at the end of 
their shifts. 60   The district court granted Kellogg’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that compensation for time spent donning and doffing was 
excluded under Section 203(o).61  The district court also found that workers are 
not entitled to compensation for the time spent traveling between the work line 
and the changing rooms following activity excluded by Section 203(o).62 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that 
compensation for the time spent donning and doffing was excluded under 
Section 203(o).63  However, the court implied that the post-donning and pre-
doffing time spent traveling between the changing room and work line was 
compensable depending on the amount of time spent traveling.64  In determining 
whether the donning and doffing was a principal activity despite the Section 
203(o) exclusion, the court employed the long-established test for principal 
activities—whether the excluded activity is “integral and indispensible” to the 
employee’s performance of his job duties. 65   The Sixth Circuit, without 
providing further analysis, assumed that because the changing time would be 
considered principal without the exclusion, it must be considered principal when 
the exclusion is applied.66 
                                                        
 59. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 870 
(2014); see also DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Opinion Letter, FLSA2007-10, at 1 
(May 14, 2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05 
_14_10_FLSA.pdf.pdf (finding that activities excluded by Section 203(o) is not principal in nature 
and therefore cannot trigger compensation for the continuous workday). 
 60. Kellogg, 619 F.3d at 607–08. 
 61. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., No. 08-2268-JPM-TMP, 2009 WL 6093442, at *12 (W.D. Tenn. 
July 20, 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 62. See id. at 9 (granting Skidmore deference to the DOL’s determination that walking time 
following Section 203(o) donning and doffing activity is not compensable). 
 63. Franklin, 619 F.3d at 618. 
 64. Id. at 620. 
 65. Id. at 618–20. 
 66. Id. 
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2.  The Sandifer Test: If the Activity is Uncompensated, it Cannot be 
Principal in Nature 
The Seventh Circuit has come to the opposite conclusion of the Sixth 
Circuit.67  Steelworkers at U.S. Steel’s Gary, Indiana campus sued to recover 
back pay and lost wages for time spent changing and washing and traveling 
between the changing room and the factory floor at the complex.68  The district 
court found that compensation for the changing time was properly excluded 
under Section 203(o).69  However, the court certified for interlocutory appeal the 
issue of whether a Section 203(o) activity that is excluded from compensation, 
and that would otherwise be principal in nature, could trigger compensation for 
a continuous workday and result in compensation for the Gary plant’s 
employees.70 
The Seventh Circuit found that the travel time between the locker room and 
the employees’ workstation was not compensable per the Portal-to-Portal Act 
exemptions.71  Writing for the court, Judge Posner found that the time spent 
donning and doffing could not be a principal activity because it was not 
compensated.72  However, this position creates a problem for future application 
of the holding.  Whether compensation is due for a principal activity is a 
determination made as part of the analysis; it is not a requirement.73  If an 
activity must be compensated to be principal in nature, then how could any 
wrongfully uncompensated activity ever pass the muster of decades of Portal-
to-Portal Act jurisprudence? 
                                                        
 67. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870 
(2014). 
 68. Id. at 591. 
 69. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:07-CV-443RM, 2009 WL3430222, at *10 (N.D. Ind. 
Oct. 15, 2009). 
 70. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 592.  As certified for appeal, the issue was “[w]hether, where it has 
been determined that the activities of donning, doffing, and washing are not to be included in 
compensable hours of work by operation of 29 U.S.C. 203(o), such activities can nonetheless start 
the continuous workday under 29 U.S.C. 254(a).”  Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, 678 F.3d 590 
(7th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-1821, 10-1866). 
 71. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596. 
 72. Id. at 596–97.  The Seventh Circuit held: 
Section 203(o) permits the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to reclassify 
changing time as nonworking time, and they did so, agreeing that the workday would not 
start when the workers changed their clothes; it would start when they arrived at their 
work site.  If clothes-changing time is lawfully not compensated, we can’t see how it 
could be thought a principal employment activity, and so Section 254(a) exempts the 
travel time in this case. 
Id. 
 73. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). 
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3.  District Court Uncertainty: No Consistent Standard 
The district courts have been faced with multiple donning and doffing lawsuits 
in recent years.74  But absent a concrete standard from higher courts, they have 
failed to synthesize a concrete rule for the principal nature of changing activities 
under a valid compensation exclusion.  Some courts have used an analysis 
similar to the Kellogg test, 75  while others followed the Seventh Circuit by 
applying the Sandifer standard. 76   These inconsistent holdings have only 
contributed to the growing divide in Section 3(o) authority.  Nothing, however, 
has exacerbated the conflict to a greater degree than the Department of Labor’s 
(DOL) inconsistent interpretation of the nature of donning and doffing excluded 
by Section 203(o). 
4.  Administrative Uncertainty: The DOL’s Internal Split 
The DOL has created a deeply entrenched, and in some aspects political, split 
with their internal interpretation of the meaning of Section 3(o) and the nature 
of activities excluded under the provision.77  With each change of the controlling 
party in the Executive Branch, the DOL has changed its interpretation.78  During 
                                                        
 74. See, e.g., McDonald v. Kellogg Co., 740 F. Supp. (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2010), vacated in 
part on reconsideration, McDonald v. Kellogg Co., No. 08-2473-JWL, 2010 WL 4386899 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 29, 2010); Hudson v. Butterball, No. 08-5071-CV-SW-RED, 2009 WL 3486780 (W.D. Mo. 
Oct. 14, 2009); 
 75. See, e.g., McDonald, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (determining that time spent changing 
clothes is excluded from the total amount of compensated work hours); In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 
694 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1367 (M.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that donning and doffing protective gear is 
changing clothes under Section 203(o)); Arnold v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (holding that an employer need not compensate an employee for the time spent 
donning and doffing required protective clothes); Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 632 F. 
Supp. 2d 398, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff was properly denied compensation 
for donning and doffing of protective gear because the gear constituted clothes within the meaning 
of a collective bargaining agreement denying compensation for changing clothes); Gatewood v. 
Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 687, 702 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (denying employees 
compensation for donning and doffing clothing per a relevant collective bargaining agreement 
under Section 203(o)). 
 76. See, e.g., Salazar v. Butterball, No. 08-cv-02071MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979, at *15 
(D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2009) (explaining that time spent donning and doffing protective clothing is not 
compensable because it is not “work”); Hudson v. Butterball, No. 08-5071-CV-SW-RED, 2009 
WL 3486780, *6 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 14, 2009) (holding that “time spent sanitizing, donning, doffing, 
and walking is excluded from the definition of hours worked in 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)”); Sisk v. Sara 
Lee Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1010 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs may not be 
compensated for donning or doffing required protective gear under Section 203(o)); Collins v. 
Sanderson Farms, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (E.D. La. 2008) (explaining that time spent 
changing into or out of clothes required for work is not compensable under Section 203(o)). 
 77. See infra notes 77–80. 
 78. See, e.g., DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Opinion Letter, FLSA2007-10, at 1 
(May 14, 2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05 
_14_10_FLSA.pdf.pdf (asserting, under the Bush Administration, that the DOL believed changing 
time not compensated under Section 3(o) is not a principal activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act); 
DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, at 1 (June 
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the Bush Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL determined 
that work time performed under a valid Section 203(o) exclusion could not be 
considered a principal activity.79  The Division stated that under Section 203(o), 
certain activities excluded from compensation by an applicable collective 
bargaining agreement, such as the donning and doffing work clothes, are not 
principal activities, and therefore cannot begin the workday.  Furthermore, the 
Division found that since the excluded activities were not principal in nature, 
walking time subsequent to excluded donning and doffing could not be a 
compensable integral and indispensable part of the workday.80 
In contrast, in 2009, the new Executive Administration changed this position 
and held that Section 203(o) activities can be principal in nature.81  In doing so, 
the Department of Labor stated that “the character of donning and doffing 
activities is not dependent upon whether such activities are excluded pursuant to 
a collective-bargaining agreement,” and thus activities occurring after donning 
clothing were within the workday and may be compensable as such under the 
Portal-to-Portal Act.82 
The Department of Labor’s fickle interpretations have led to hesitation by the 
courts in adopting any standard. 83   As demonstrated, the ever-growing 
authoritative split has resulted in a clear divide in the courts and the executive 
                                                        
16, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/ 
FLSAAI2010_2.pdf (asserting, under the Obama administration, that changing time not 
compensated under Section 3(o) can be a principal activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act). 
 79. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Opinion Letter FLSA2007-10, at 1 (May 14, 
2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05_14_10_FLSA.pdf.pdf. 
 80. Id. at 1.  The Division stated: 
Section 3(o) of the FLSA excludes “any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the 
beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time 
during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona 
fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.” In 
promulgating this provision Congress plainly excluded activities covered by Section 3(o) 
from time that would otherwise be “[h]ours worked.”  Accordingly, activities covered by 
Section 3(o) cannot be considered principal activities and do not start the workday. 
Walking time after a 3(o) activity is therefore not compensable unless it is preceded by a 
principal activity. Id. 
 81. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, at 
(June 16, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLS 
AAI2010_2.pdf. 
 82. Id. at 4 (quoting Figas v. Horsehead Corp., 2008 WL 4170043 (W.D. Pa. 2008)). 
 83. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870 
(2014).  Judge Posner rejected the DOL’s interpretation of the principal nature of  
Section 203(o) activity, commenting that its fickle nature makes the Department of Labor’s position 
appear as little more than political posturing to change along with each administration.  Id. (stating 
that 
It would be a considerable paradox if before 2001 the plaintiffs would win because the 
President was a Democrat, between 2001 and 2009 the defendant would win because the 
President was a Republican, and in 2012 the plaintiffs would win because the President 
is again a Democrat.  That would make a travesty of the principle of deference. . . . 
Id. 
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agencies. This split has created uncertainty about the compensability of travel 
time following donning and doffing activity excluded under Section 203(o).  It 
has also produced two standards of analysis that ignore crucial legislative intent 
and the negative effects the standards may have on collective bargaining.  
II.  NO USABLE STANDARD: THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN SECTION 
203(O) AND THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT 
A.  The Kellogg Test: Right Result, Wrong Process 
The Sixth Circuit applied a traditional Portal-to-Portal Act analysis for 
Section 203(o) activity.84  In its analysis, the court first determined whether a 
Section 203(o) exclusion is valid, and then examined whether the excluded 
donning and doffing is “integral and indispensible” to the performance of the 
employee’s job duties.85  If the activity is integral and indispensible, then the 
Section 203(o) activity is a principal activity that triggers compensation for 
travel time under the continuous workday rule.86  Unlike the Sandifer test, the 
Sixth Circuit’s analysis fits neatly into past Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence.87 
The legislative history of Section 203(o) partially supports the Kellogg 
approach.  In the floor debate accompanying the passage of the exclusion, the 
sponsor of the amendments noted that some collective bargaining agreements 
exempted changing clothes from compensation while others did not, and 
explained that in either case the decision was made carefully and “apparently 
both [the employers and employees] are completely satisfied with respect to 
their bargaining agreements.”88  The legislative history demonstrates that the 
Section 203(o) exclusion was designed to preserve the “sanctity of collective 
bargaining agreements” that exclude from compensation payment for the 
donning and doffing of work clothes.89  This intent is properly incorporated in 
Kellogg. 
There are two major approaches to statutory interpretation and the role of 
legislative intent in that construction. Both of these models support the resulting 
Kellogg standard.  One of these approaches, commonly known as formalism, 
proposes that a plain reading of the text and structure of a statute present the 
                                                        
 84. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 85. Id. at 619 (predicating compensation under Section 203(o) for donning or doffing on 
whether the activity “is integral and indispensable” to the employee’s job and not on whether the 
activity is a principal activity). 
 86. Id. at 618-20 (examining initially whether the activity can be principal in nature, and then 
whether the activity is “integral and indispensible under the FLSA”). 
 87. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also supra Part I.B (discussing the 
Portal-to-Portal Act analysis currently employed by courts). 
 88. 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter). 
 89. Id. 
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outer limits of a court’s interpretation of the scope of that statute.90  Applying a 
plain text reading to the exclusion gets a clear result.  The text of the exclusion 
takes away compensation for otherwise compensable changing clothes and 
washing time.91  Nowhere in the text is there any mention of altering the nature 
of the activity.  Therefore, a plain text reading of Section 203(o) shows that it 
should not be interpreted to alter the nature of donning and doffing.  Instead, 
under this formalist approach, courts should limit the reading of Section 203(o) 
to removing the specified activities from compensation.  As a result, a formalist 
reading of the exclusion supports the Kellogg standard. 
In contrast to formalism, legal realists seek to interpret a statute by applying 
the legislators’ intent through examining legislative purpose and applying 
“interpretative principles.”92  Some of these principles include evaluating the 
intent and the then interpreting the statute through the lens of that intent as well 
as “constitutional norms” and  “institutional concerns” in a way that mends 
“statutory failure in the regulatory state.” 93   Applying these interpretive 
principles from the realism model, an examination of Section 203(o) should be 
read to: (1) protect the weaker party, which in this case is the workers;94 (2) 
create a uniform application of FLSA principles; 95  and (3) ensure that the 
application of the exclusion is fair and just.96 
                                                        
 90. Formalism is premised on a distrust of the political nature of legislative history and 
therefore chooses to rely solely on the text of the statute.  See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the role of the Court is to “give fair and 
reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code,” and “not to enter the minds of the 
Members of Congress—who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful 
and effective”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 61 (1988) (“Original meaning is derived from words and structure, 
and perhaps from identifying the sort of problem the legislature was trying to address. . . . Meaning 
comes from the ring the words would have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about 
the same problem.”); William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 690 
(1990) (“The new textualists are right in pointing legal scholars toward the process of evolution, 
and away from a focus on the original discussions. Hence, as Justice Scalia asserts, the legislative 
history discussion ought not be central to the interpretive enterprise . . .”). 
 91. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006 & 2012). 
 92. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 454–76 (1989); see also Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (And Against “Nonsense” 
Jurisprudence”), 100 GEO. L.J. 865, 893 (2012) (“Praise for Realism is praise for clarity about 
what really happens, since what really happens is the very stuff on which instrumental reasoning 
— reasoning about how to achieve what we already want, prefer, or value—operates.”); Thomas J. 
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 850 (2008) (explaining 
that the need for the legal system to function justly and quickly supersedes the need for a 
comprehensive understanding of each minute term, and thus “[l]egal academics and the lawyers 
they train must often make normative evaluations of legal rules and institutions on the basis of only 
partial information”). 
 93. See Sunstein, supra note 92, at 454–76. 
 94. Id. at 477. 
 95. Id. at 479. 
 96. Id. at 482. 
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Applying these principles lends further support to the Kellogg standard and 
discredits the Sandifer standard.  The Sixth Circuit’s approach in Kellogg gives 
greater protection to the employees by requiring the employer to prove that both 
the excluded activity and subsequent travel time is not compensable, results in a 
uniform application by limiting exemptions and expanding minimum standards, 
and is fair because it limits the scope of the exclusion.97  The Sandifer standard 
does just the opposite as it takes away the protection of minimum standards to 
this class of employees, creates inconsistencies by expanding the exclusions 
from FLSA coverage, and is unfair because it penalizes workers that choose to 
use the exclusion and bargain away compensation for changing and washing 
time. 98   Thus, the Kellogg standard, which grants both the employer and 
employee a benefit from the exclusion, was properly generated by a legislative 
intent analysis through an application of both the formalist and realist 
approaches to statutory analysis. 
However, the Kellogg standard assumes the application of the donning and 
doffing exclusion in Section 203(o) is disconnected from the activity itself and 
leaves open the examination of the nature of the activity for any subsequent 
Portal-to-Portal Act claims. 99   Devoid of a clear analysis of the interplay 
between Section 203(o) and the Portal-to-Portal Act or a definitive rule for the 
principal nature of excluded changing and washing, the Kellogg ruling does little 
to solve the uncertainty created by the statute’s failure to mention the coverage 
of travel time following excluded changing and washing time.100 As a result, the 
ambiguity created by the Kellogg court over whether an activity has to be 
compensated to qualify as a principal activity has come under attack by the 
Seventh Circuit, which requires compensation for an activity to be principal in 
nature.101 
B.  The Sandifer Test: Placing Economic Theories Above Established 
Jurisprudence 
The Sandifer test enunciated by Judge Posner conflicts with well-established 
Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence.  In his decision, Judge Posner struggled with 
the notion that an uncompensated activity could ever be principal in nature and 
trigger the start of the continuous workday. 102   Judge Posner justified this 
                                                        
 97. See Franklin v. Kellogg, 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 98. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870 
(2014). 
 99. See Kellogg, 619 F.3d at 619 (concluding that whether an activity is principal does not 
depend on its compensability, and therefore the court must consider whether the activity is an 
“integral and indispensible” part of the employee’s job). 
 100. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 598 (explaining that the Kellogg court did not explain its 
reasoning for deeming a noncompensable activity a principal activity). 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. at 596.  Judge Posner explained that it is illogical to hold that an uncompensated 
activity can be an “integral and indispensible” activity because employees are required to do many 
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assertion by engaging in an economic analysis grounded in law and economics 
theory.103  In his view, granting compensation for travel time following excluded 
donning and doffing activity would create a new, economically destructive 
minimum standard which would either be offset by the employer through lower 
wages or layoffs.104 
This view, while considered the majority approach for economic analysis, is 
not without opposition.105  Several contemporary economic scholars believe that 
minimum economic standards are not economically destructive, but instead 
constitute a policy decision with little to no economic effect.106  One such view 
theorizes that although labor markets appear competitive, in a broad sense they 
                                                        
things for which they are not compensated.  Id.  As part of this explanation, Judge Posner 
differentiated between tasks an employee is employed to do and tasks that are required as 
tangentially necessary, such as showing up for work and calling in sick, noting, for example, that 
employees are not compensated for the time they spend on the phone to call in sick.  Id. 
 103. Id. at 597. 
 104. Id.  Judge Posner explained that compensating employees for travel time would impose 
higher costs on employers that would ultimately be transferred to employees through lower wages.  
Id.  He reasoned that by compensating employees for the time they spent traveling would result in 
employees doing less productive work during the specified eight-hour shift than was done 
previously, thereby causing employers to lower wages in compensation or to impose restrictions 
limiting travel time, which can also translate in to lower wages.  Id.  However, Judge Posner’s 
hypothesis ignores the legal regime of unionized workplaces. And, would his hypothesis occur, it 
would not necessarily be an evil to be corrected since Congress, in enacting the National Labor 
Relations Act, put into place a national policy of collective bargaining and economic choice.  29 
U.S.C. § 151 (2006 & 2012).  As part of this regime, it is unlawful for an employer to make changes 
to the wages, hours, and working conditions covered by a collective bargaining agreement without 
first bargaining with the union.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (d).  Therefore, if in a union workplace 
an employer and union bargained to offset a gain from an increase in minimum standards through 
other economic provisions, then the employer and the union engaged in conduct that is explicitly 
endorsed under the National Labor Relations Act. 
 105. See, e.g., David Card & Alan B. Kreuger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case 
Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1397, 
1398 (2000) (concluding that the 1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage did not decrease 
the overall number of fast-food workers in the state); Bruce E. Kaufman, Institutional Economics 
and the Minimum Wage: Broadening the Theoretical and Policy Debate, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 427, 427–28 (2010) (arguing that minimum standards are necessary policy choices that may 
have positive effects on employment); Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Kreuger, The Effect of the New 
Minimum Wage Law in a Low Wage Labor Market 7–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 3655, 1991) (asserting that many low-wage employers ignored the rule allowing them to 
pay below-minimum wages to youth workers and that many of the employers whose paid wages 
above the set minimum raised their wages even further to remain competitive in the marketplace); 
David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence 
from the New Minimum Wage Research 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
12663, 2006) (noting that although their research has shown negative trends in employment for 
low-wage workers as a result of increased minimum wages, a significant amount of research shows 
that no effect, a negligible effect, or even a positive effect on employment as a result of minimum 
wage increases). 
 106. See Kaufman, supra note 105, at 427–28; Neumark & Wascher, supra note 105 at 5–6. 
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heavily favor the employer due to the employer’s disguised market power.107  
As a result, absent progressive social norms and labor policies, the supposedly 
competitive labor market becomes inherently unequal.108 
Additionally, Alan Krueger and David Card have studied the effects of a 
minimum wage increase on employment in the New Jersey restaurant 
industry. 109   The study reached the opposite conclusion of Judge Posner’s 
economic assumptions, finding that instead of a decrease in New Jersey 
employment post-wage increase, employment increased after the higher wage 
was implemented.110  While this study is not without critique,111 two of the 
criticizing economists performed their own empirical analysis of Krueger and 
Card’s data and found that the although employment did not increase, the 
negative effects of the minimum wage increase in Kreuger and Card’s study 
were negligible.112 
Nevertheless, Judge Posner promulgated a standard for travel time that 
follows excluded donning and doffing activity that requires that the donning and 
doffing activity be compensated in order to be principal in nature.113   This 
conclusion, however, complicates the application of Portal-to-Portal Act 
jurisprudence and conflicts with decades of well-established law. 
                                                        
 107. Kaufman, supra note 105, at 434, 437 (explaining that “labor markets are always and 
everywhere imperfectly competitive”). 
 108. Id. at 438.  The argument is based on the notion that employers and labor markets are, by 
their nature, parasitic. See Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard 
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101, 125–26 (1988) (arguing that 
workers will not benefit from increases in minimum wage).  This market failure forces societies to 
consider the problem in terms of “choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with 
harmful effects” of the market failure.  Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 18 (1960).  Studies of world economics have shown that a more equal income distribution results 
in greater economic growth. Kaufman, supra note 105, at 444.  Therefore, pro-minimum standard 
scholars conclude, higher wages do not negatively effect the distribution of wages within labor 
markets, but instead are a solution to inequality in the marketplace that will result in greater 
efficiency and market stabilization.  Id.  In other words, an established minimum term, like 
compensation for travel time following a Section 203(o) activity that is a principal in nature will 
offset this inequality by creating efficient terms across the entire labor market, which cannot be 
rejected by an employer seeking to offset costs.  See Willborn, supra, at 126. 
 109. David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772, 792 (1994) (finding 
that New Jersey fast-food employers expanded their work forces following the increase in the 
minimum wage). 
 110. Id. 
 111. David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study 
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1362, 
1362–63 (2000) (criticizing Card and Krueger’s study on the grounds that their data methodology 
was flawed and that estimates based on a different data set comprised of payroll data suggested that 
fast-food employment fell after the minimum wage increase). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870 
(2014). 
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The crux of Portal-to-Portal Act judicial interpretations is whether the activity 
is principal in nature and should be compensated.114  If the reviewing court finds 
that the nature of the activity is integral and indispensible to the employee’s job 
duties, then the activity is principal in nature, and all the activities that follow 
must be compensated.115  The analysis, however, does not require that an activity 
be compensated to be principal, because determining whether compensation is 
due is the purpose of the analysis.  In contrast, Sandifer makes payment of 
compensation a requirement for an activity to be a principal activity that can 
trigger compensation for a continuous workday, in effect making compensation 
a prerequisite to further compensation.116  The Sandifer test, therefore, frustrates 
the application of decades of principal activity precedent.117 
Since 1956, when the Supreme Court decided Steiner v. Mitchell, the 
uniformly applied test for determining when an activity is principal in nature has 
asked whether the activity is “integral and indispensible” to the performance of 
the employee’s job duties.118  This test has been applied across the spectrum of 
Portal-to-Portal Act cases.119  Recently, the Supreme Court also applied this test 
                                                        
 114. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255–56 (1956). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596. 
 117. Posner’s analysis in Sandifer is in three parts: 1) is the donning and doffing activity 
principal in nature and therefore capable of being excluded under Section 203(o); 2) did the union 
and employer waive compensation for the principal donning and doffing activity in question; and 
3) does the fact that the employer and union have decided to forego compensation for an otherwise 
principal activity alter the nature of that donning and doffing.  Id.  Although Section 203(o) 
excludes by agreement compensation for the time spent changing in and out of work clothes, there 
is no indication that excluding compensation alters the principal status of that activity. 
 118. See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 255; see also supra note 73 (listing cases that have applied the 
Steiner standard). 
 119. See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005) (holding that, under the  
Portal-to-Portal Act, “an activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity’ is itself 
a ‘principal activity’”); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 738–39 (1981) 
(explaining that courts should consider whether an activity is integral and indispensible to the 
principal activity in analyzing whether compensation is due); Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 
U.S. 260, 263 (1956) (finding that knife-sharpening is integral and indispensible to principal 
butchering activities and therefore must be compensated); Perez v. Mountaine Farms, Inc., 650 
F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying the integral and indispensible test); Bamonte v. City of 
Mesa, 598 F.3d 1217, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202, 
208 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that because a worker’s donning and doffing activities were not 
integral and indispensible to any principal activity, the actions were not compensable); De Ascensio 
v. Tysons Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 2007) (adopting the integral and indispensible 
test in deciding whether donning and doffing is compensable); Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., 
Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the integral and indispensible test to determine 
if compensation was due for required security screening and employer-provided transportation); 
Bienkowski v. Northeastern Univ., 285 F.3d 138, 140–41 (1st Cir. 2002); Adams v. Alcoa, Inc., 
822 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the time spent by employees in EMT 
training was not integral and indispensible to a principal activity and therefore was not 
compensable); Wright v. Pulaski Cnty., No. 4:09CV00065 SWW, 2010 WL 3328015, at *4 (E.D. 
Ark. Aug. 24, 2010) (noting that because workers can don and doff uniforms at home these 
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in determining that the required donning and doffing of work clothes may be 
principal in nature.120  Before the recent Section 203(o) cases, the courts never 
required that an activity be compensated in order to be principal in nature.121  
Instead, courts have reached the antithetical result; requiring compensation only 
if an activity is principal in nature.122 
Aside from the jurisprudential issues of the Sandifer standard, the legislative 
history of Section 203(o) referenced in the Sandifer opinion clearly states that 
Congress designed the exclusion to allow unions and employers to bargain away 
compensation for donning and doffing time.123  The legislative history makes no 
mention of the union and employer being able to bargain over, or change, the 
nature of the activity.124  Congress was well aware of the continuous workday 
rule when it debated and passed the Section 3(o) exclusion.125  If Congress 
intended for Section 203(o) to alter the nature of the activity, they would have 
explicitly stated so.126  That Congress did not intend or foresee the use of Section 
3(o) exclusions waiving the nature of job activities lends further support for 
denouncing Judge Posner’s analysis.127 
As a result, future courts should reject the Sandifer test as incompatible with 
the current authority on and legislative history of the Portal-to-Portal Act.  Since 
the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act, courts have looked to the nature of the 
activity when deciding whether the time spent in the activity should be 
compensated.128  Instead of taking a step towards closing the divide in authority, 
Judge Posner’s approach created additional uncertainties that are contrary to 
well-established law.129 
                                                        
activities are not integral and indispensible and thus not compensable); Andrako v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (applying the integral and indispensable test); Martin v. 
City of Richmond, 504 F. Supp. 2d 766, 776–77 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same). 
 120. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29. 
 121. For the current Portal-to-Portal Act analysis, which requires an examination of the nature 
of the activity, see supra Part I. 
 122. See supra notes 112–13. 
 123. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing the 
preamble to the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006)), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014). Judge 
Posner’s analysis of the legislative history focuses on the Portal-to-Portal Act’s purpose of avoiding 
judicial windfalls for employees gained by large, unexpected costs on employers.  See id.  This 
analysis, however, ignores several key aspects of the legislative history.  Nowhere in the legislative 
history is there any mention of an employer and union being able to change the nature of the activity 
being performed, nor does it address the history of Section 203(o), which focused instead on 
waiving compensation to preserve collective-bargaining agreements. 
 124. Instead, the focus is on preserving collective bargaining agreements that make certain 
activities uncompensated.  See supra Part II.A. 
 125. The continuous workday rule has long been an established part of employment law 
jurisprudence.  See 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter). 
 126. See supra note 88. 
 127. See supra Part I (discussing the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act). 
 128. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also supra note 113. 
 129. See infra Part III. 
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III.  ADOPTING A NEW STANDARD: THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 203(O) 
SHOULD PROVIDE CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS. 
Because of the continuing divide in Section 203(o) jurisprudence, the courts 
should create a definitive rule for the compensability of travel time following 
excluded donning and doffing.  Numerous bargaining units have a  
hard-negotiated history of agreements that place the beginning of the 
compensated workday at the time employees commence productive work at their 
workstations.130  This bargaining history, however, has ignored the language and 
intent of Section 203(o) for nearly seven decades and has led to protracted 
litigation. 
The text of the exclusion states that bona fide collective bargaining units may 
exclude from compensation time spent in donning and doffing activities.131  This 
raises the question: Why would the exclusion be applied if the donning and 
doffing activity was not a principal activity and thus, not compensable?  
Therefore, the courts should adopt a standard that holds any valid application of 
the exclusion, either through express contractual language or assertion by the 
court following a finding of custom and past practices, is a per se principal 
activity that triggers compensation for a continuous workday. 
A.  The Principles of Collective Bargaining Support the Proposed Standard 
At its core, Section 203(o) is a collective bargaining statute.132  Therefore, the 
recommended standard to resolve the current authoritative conflict regarding 
                                                        
 130. See, e.g., Agreement By and Between Washington Employers, Inc. and International 
Brotherhood of Boilermakers Local No. 104, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/cba/private/cbrp_2280_pri.pdf (establishing the 
workday in Article VI); Collective Bargaining Agreement Between D’Agostino Supermarkets Inc. 
and Local 1500, U.F.C.W., at 3 (Sept. 11, 2005), available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs 
/compliance/cba/pdf/cbrp0594.pdf (“Except for part-time employees, forty (40) hours shall 
constitute the regular work week for all employees covered herein, and it shall consist of five (5) 
eight (8) hour days.”); C.f. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between SNE Enterprises, Inc. and 
Midwestern Council of Industrial Workers of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, at 16 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance 
/cba/pdf/cbrp1897.pdf (outlining the procedures for the assignment of overtime but not defining a 
standard workday). 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). 
 132. See 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter).  The legislative 
history of the FLSA makes it clear that, even though the statute was enacted to alleviate inequality 
and set minimum standards for all American workers, there was no intention to disrupt private 
sector collective bargaining.  See PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, ADDRESS OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DELIVERED BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE TWO HOUSES 
OF CONGRESS, in H.R. DOC. NO. 75-458, at 4 (Jan. 3, 1938).  While debating the FLSA in 1938, 
President Roosevelt stated that, although the FLSA should address the reality of the unorganized 
workforce, the statute was not intended to interfere with the national labor policy of collective 
bargaining.  Id.  In fact, in an address to Congress he specifically recognized the importance of 
collective bargaining when determining pay for hours worked by employees.  Id.  This was repeated 
by senior officials within the Roosevelt administration, when then-Attorney General Robert H. 
Jackson testified to Congress that the “[FLSA] gives effect to collective bargaining.” Fair Labor 
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travel time following Section 203(o) activity should be examined alongside the 
principles of collective bargaining. 
Collective bargaining is “a continuous, dynamic, institutional process for 
solving problems arising directly out of the employer-employee relationship.”133  
In application, many see collective bargaining as a way by which employees 
exert unified pressure to obtain higher wages and better benefits from their 
employers.134  Thus, an agreement born from the bargaining process acts as a 
check on the “prerogatives of an unrestrained management.”135  Simply put, 
collective bargaining is a set of economic choices made collectively by the 
employer and the union. 
1.  The Nature of Collective Bargaining Requires Certainty of the Legal 
Effects of Section 203(o) 
Because collective bargaining is a set of economic exchanges, there must be 
certainty regarding the effects of applying Section 203(o) or else the bargaining 
parties may be unwilling to apply it.136   If there is no certainty, union and 
employer may force themselves into continuous arbitration over the meaning of 
the exclusion as applied to their bargaining unit.137  This will result in parties 
                                                        
Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearing on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. on Education 
and Labor and the H. Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong. 22 (1937) (statement of Robert H. Jackson, 
Att’y General of the United States).  It is well established that collective bargaining cannot serve 
to eliminate the minimum standards set by the FLSA.  See, e.g., Brooklyn Bank v. O’Neil,324 U.S. 
697, 704 (1945) (holding that “[w]here a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate 
a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be 
allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate.”); see also 
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. 
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)) (stating in dicta that because the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that the right to a minimum wage and overtime pay is nonwaivable, “FLSA rights 
cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of 
the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”).  The FLSA, however, 
does allow union employees to waive minimum compensation for changing and washing time.  29 
U.S.C. § 203(o); see also Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1956) (discussing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(o)). But, nowhere in the text or history of the amendment is there any indication that Congress 
also intended for this waiver to apply to the nature of the activity thus affecting the structure of the 
workday outside of changing and washing time. 
 133. HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4 (Dale Yoder 
ed., 2d ed. 1959).  The term is believed to be originally conceived by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.  
Id.; see SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 173 n.1 (1897). 
 134. David E. Feller, A Theory of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 
720 (1973). 
 135. Id. at 721. 
 136. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) (“Indeed, the 
existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’ willingness 
to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes.”). 
 137. Without a doubt, some collective bargaining agreement provisions will have ambiguities 
that need to be resolved through arbitration or by the courts.  These processes, however, should not 
interpret ambiguities in a way that discourages concerted activity, but instead should foster the 
public goals of collective bargaining.  Thus disputes over the meaning of a contract terms are the 
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refusing to agree to apply Section 203(o) exclusions to avoid guesswork and 
high administrative costs. 
In contrast, the test recommended herein creates certainty in application of the 
exclusion.  Whether the exclusion results from agreement or custom, the 
proposed standard creates an irrefutable presumption that the activity is principal 
in nature, and that any subsequent travel time is compensable. 
2.  Any Viable Standard Must Ensure Fairness Between the Bargaining 
Parties. 
Labor organizations advance the interests of the workers in the bargaining unit 
by “regulat[ing] terms and conditions of employment and the relations between 
[labor and management].”138  For example, the union may bargain away a dollar-
per-hour raise to gain improved safety standards or a higher pension 
contribution.  The employer, in turn, may seek to set off any extra costs or 
benefits achieved by the union through other means.  But for a Section 203(o) 
exclusion to remain effective in the bargaining process, it needs to be applied 
fairly and must avoid unduly rewarding or penalizing one party.139 
By altering the nature of the activity, the Sandifer standard penalizes the union 
and gives an extra benefit to the employer by expanding the scope of the waived 
activity to also include subsequent travel time.140  In contrast, the proposed 
standard ensures fairness in the application of the exclusion.  If an employer and 
the union choose to waive compensation for Section 203(o) activity, then the 
waiver would do just that and nothing more.141  Applying the exclusion in a 
                                                        
proper subject matter of arbitration.  See, e.g., U.S. Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564, 568 (1960) (stating that when an agreement is covered by an arbitration clause, courts presume 
that a dispute over the agreement is covered by the clause and should be settled in arbitration).  The 
overwhelming majority of collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration clauses, which 
would require any dispute between the union and employer over the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement to be settled through an arbitration process. See Feller, supra note 129 at 747. 
 138. Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero & Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning 
Collective Bargaining, 139 INT’L LABOUR L. REV. 33, 51 (2000), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/revue/download/pdf/gernigon.pdf. 
 139. Gary Chartier, Sweatshops, Labor Rights, and Competitive Advantage, 10 OR. REV. INT’L 
L. 149, 160 (2008) (“It is thus appropriate for the law to shape bargaining situations and contractual 
terms to prevent exploitation and coercion.”); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic 
of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 562 (1989) (asserting that the Taft-Hartley Act, and thus 
collective bargaining, “strengthened the ethical values of truthfulness and fairness in collective 
bargaining.”). 
 140. The standard in Sandifer will result in the employer not only achieving a waiver of 
compensation for the Section 203(o) activity, but also every activity performed by the employee up 
until the moment the employee begins productive work at their work station.  See Sandifer v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).  In contrast, the members 
of the bargaining unit, who presumably bargained away compensation for the changing time will 
lose compensation beyond the scope of the waiver.  See id.  This unbalances the bargaining process 
and thus could undermine the effectiveness of Section 203(o) exclusions. 
 141. The Kellogg framework will ensure that the only compensation bargained away is for the 
Section 203(o) activity.  See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010).  This maintains 
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balanced and limited manner combined with the principle that labor unions 
inherently protect the interests of their workers demonstrates that courts should 
apply the proposed standard in order to preserve fairness in the bargaining 
process. 
B.  The Economic Choice of Collective Bargaining Supports the Proposed 
Standard 
In Sandifer, the Seventh Circuit panel expressed doubt that interpreting 
Section 203(o) activity as principal in nature would be seen merely as an illusory 
gain in wages because doing so would set a new minimum employment 
standard, which would be offset by the employer.142  This theory, based on a law 
and economics analysis, 143  ignores the economic realities of unionized 
workplaces.144  Section 203(o) can only be applied to unionized workplaces.145  
Any of the potential employer offsets to maintain economic equilibrium that the 
Seventh Circuit was concerned about are not certain to occur.146  Employers that 
wish to offset the compensation for travel time must bargain with the union 
                                                        
balance as the benefit achieved by the employer does not result in compensation that is outside the 
scope of the waiver and that the employee would otherwise be entitled to.  See id. 
 142. Recording of Oral Argument, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 f.3d 590 (2012) (Nos.  
10-1821, 10-1866), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/MA0XB9JY.mp3; see also 
Willborn, supra note 101, at 114 (“Because imposition of minimal terms is the equivalent of a wage 
increase and because an exogenous wage increase reduces the demand for labor, any benefits to 
workers from minimum terms in the short run are paid for by other workers in unemployment.”). 
 143. An economic analysis of the law focuses on the reciprocal nature of economic harm.  In 
other words, assuming that two economic actors are in perfect competition then any harm inflicted 
by one actor on another will be accompanied by an equal amount of harm on the inflicting actor. 
See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (summarizing the nature 
of reciprocal economic harm). 
 144. Unlike non-union workplaces, union employers are subject to numerous restrictions on 
the actions that they can take without the consent of the union.  See infra note 141 (discussing these 
employer restrictions). 
 145. Section 203(o) excludes “any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning 
or end of each workday . . . by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide 
collective bargaining agreement.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).  Therefore, only unionized 
employees can exclude the compensation for changing time from their workday.  See id. 
 146. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes the employer’s 
obligation to bargain with the recognized union regarding “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(d).  Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA labels any failure 
to fulfill the obligation to bargain in good faith as an unfair labor practice.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).  
Courts have interpreted this provision to prohibit unilateral modification of contract terms 
contained in a collective bargaining agreement.  See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 
268 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1984), aff’d sub nom, UAW v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
Additionally, the courts have interpreted Section 8(a)(5) to prohibit unilateral modification of 
contract terms made to wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment when the terms 
are not contained in the collective bargaining agreement.  NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).  
As a result, there is a strong regulatory regime that stops unionized employers from enacting the 
very changes that concern the Seventh Circuit without first consulting with the union. 
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before doing so.147  Therefore, the employer and the union must agree to any 
economic offset due to new compensation for travel time. 
The United States has a national labor policy of collective bargaining.148  The 
government encourages employers and unions to settle the very conflicts that 
the Seventh Circuit identified.149 In line with this policy, the courts should not 
assume a theoretical result of collective bargaining.  Instead, courts should 
recognize the minimum standards required by the FLSA, including required 
compensation for travel time following a principal activity, and invite collective 
bargaining over any remaining terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The current authoritative split regarding Section 203(o) activity is both 
damaging to employee compensation and in conflict with decades of  
Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence.  This conflict has the potential to frustrate the 
very purpose of Section 203(o)—preserving collective bargaining agreements.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court should adopt a new, definitive standard that 
creates certainty, ensures fairness, and recognizes the economic choice of 
collective bargaining. 
The proposed standard does just that.  If a unionized employer wish to employ 
the Section 203(o) exclusion, they must also recognize that they are endorsing 
the donning and doffing as a per se principal activity that triggers compensation 
for the continuous workday.  This standard will allow the parties to bargain 
vigorously over the use of Section 203(o) but not extend the exclusion beyond 
the original scope enunciated by Congress or the bargaining parties. 
 
  
                                                        
 147. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743. 
 148. 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 149. Id. 
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